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ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONALISM CIRCA 
2005, OR, SOME FUNNY THINGS 
HAPPENED AFTER THE REVOLUTION 
PUBLIC LAW. By Adam Tomkins.1 Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2003. Pp. xx, 231. $24.95. 
Ernest A. Younl 
American constitutional lawyers have always been curious 
about British public law. Blackstone, of course, was the most 
widely-read legal work in the early republic. More recently, the 
United States Supreme Court has construed Congress's power to 
control its membership in light of the 18th century British contro-
versy over John Wilkes's election to Parliament;3 the power of 
juries to hear patent claims by reference to the 18th century prac-
tice of the courts at Westminster;4 and the proper treatment of 
citizens accused of levying war against their country with regard 
to English practice dating back to the 14'h century Statute of 
Treasons.5 As these examples indicate, however, our compara-
tive interest in British arrangements has typically been confined 
to old British arrangements-presumably because it is the Brit-
ish institutions and practices antecedent to the American found-
ing that can tell us most about our own. We have been compara-
tively less interested in what British public law has become in the 
centuries since the unpleasantness at Lexington, Saratoga, and 
Yorktown. 
I. John Millar Professor of Public Law, University of Glasgow. 
2. Judge Benjamin Harrison Powell Professor of Law, the University of Texas at 
Austin. B.A. Dartmouth College 1990; J.D. Harvard Law School 1993. I am grateful to 
my friend Adam Tomkins for many interesting and enlightening conversations, to Brian 
Bix, Sandy Levinson, Frank Michelman, and Scot Powe for helpful comments and sug-
gestions on the manuscript, to Carina Cuellar for research assistance, and to Allegra 
Young for putting up with me while I wrote this. 
3. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 789 (1995); Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,527-31 (1969). 
4. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,376-84 (1996). 
5. See Hamdi v. Rurnsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,559 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
771 
772 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:771 
This American focus on the 18th century makes reading 
about current British public law a bit like hearing about what 
your relatives have been up to after having been out of touch for 
a long time: Parts of it are more interesting than others, some of 
it just sounds crazy, and occasionally you hear something that 
yields unexpected insight into your own life. It's for the latter 
sort of insight that most readers of this journal will read Adam 
Tomkins's Public Law, an insightful and accessible new addition 
to the same Clarendon Law Series that gave us H.L.A. Hart's 
The Concept of Law years ago. Your humble reviewer is in no 
position to evaluate Public Law in terms of what seems to be its 
primary aim- that is, as a descriptive account of British constitu-
tionalism at the opening of the new century, with some norma-
tive prescriptions for the betterment of the British legal system. 
Instead, I want to focus on Professor Tomkins's work as an ex-
ample of transatlantic constitutional discourse. In that context, 
Public Law has some valuable contributions for American con-
stitutionalists, and it also provides the occasion for some sugges-
tions as to how American experience may inform current British 
debates. 
I. EAST TO WEST 
Despite its rather encompassing title, Public Law is focused 
quite firmly on the public law of England.6 Although ambitious 
within its sphere-How many books purport to offer a general 
analysis of American constitutional law within the confines of a 
mere 211 pages?-its excursions into general principles of consti-
tutionalism are offered for purposes of introduction rather than 
as prescriptions for other legal systems. Nonetheless, Professor 
Tomkins's discussion of general principles is illuminating for par-
ticipants in other systems. I want to focus on two aspects of that 
discussion: the distinctions between written and unwritten con-
stitutions, and between legal and political constitutions. Careful 
consideration of the way those distinctions play out in the Eng-
lish system can help shed light on important debates on this side 
of the Atlantic. 
6. Very early on, Professor Tomkins disavows any aim to encompass the public 
law of the United Kingdom outside England and Wales. The Scottish and Northern Irish 
legal systems are distinct for public law purposes (pp. 2-3). One might find strange Tom-
kins' dismissal of the United Kingdom as a whole as "a young entity," having come "into 
existence only in 1800" (p. 2), until later in the book when one encounters his conviction 
that almost everything really important in British constitutionalism happened in the 17" 
century (p. 45). 
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A. WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS 
Professor Tomkins uses his introductory first chapter, "On 
Constitutions," to clear some conceptual underbrush. He begins 
by stating that "Constitutions perform three main tasks: they 
provide for the creation of the institutions of the State; they 
regulate the relations between those institutions and one an-
other; and they regulate the relations between those institutions 
and the people (citizens) they govern" (p. 3). That should be a 
relatively unexceptionable catalog for most readers, but Tom-
kins proceeds quickly to debunk some conventional wisdoms 
about the English Constitution. "The first thing anyone learns 
about English public law is that in England the constitution is 
unwritten," he says. In truth, however, "the importance of the 
distinction between written and unwritten constitutions is greatly 
exaggerated" (p. 7). 
The first problem is that the English Constitution isn't really 
"unwritten" at all. As Professor Tomkins points out, "much (in-
deed, nearly all) of the constitution is written, somewhere" 
(p.7)-whether in Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights of 1689, or 
more modern statutes like the Devolution Acts of 1998, or more 
prosaic sources like the Ministerial Code given by Prime Minis-
ters to their deputies. As others have also recognized,7 what 
people really mean when they say that the English Constitution 
is "unwritten" and that the American is "written" is that only the 
latter is codified or written down all in one place. Codifed writ-
ten constitutions, Tomkins explains, are creatures of Enlighten-
ment rationalism. England lacks a codified constitution because 
"England experienced its moments of greatest political turmoil 
well before Enlightenment thinking took hold" (pp. 7-8). 
Professor Tomkins wants to deny, however, that the distinc-
tion between written and unwritten constitutions matters very 
much in practice. "[W]ritten constitutions are not complete 
codes capable of answering all constitutional questions. Indeed 
no written constitution could ever be." Codified written constitu-
tions like America's thus end up looking much like England's 
through practice over time, because they "need to supplement 
those codes with unwritten, or more likely uncodified, rules. In 
this sense all constitutions are (at least in part) unwritten" (p. 9). 
7. See, e.g., Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 853, 855 (1%2). 
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Over-emphasis on the distinction between written and un-
written constitutions leads, in Professor Tomkins's view, to a sec-
ond mistake, which is "to say that the unwritten nature of the 
constitution means that the constitution is flexible" (p. 9). This 
way of thinking about the English Constitution relies heavily on 
the extent to which English public law is governed by conven-
tion-that is, "non-legal ... rule[s] of constitutional behaviour" 
that are "not enforceable by a court" (p. 10). As Tomkins points 
out, the fact that conventions are enforced politically rather than 
legally does not make them flexible; indeed, English public law 
generally defines a convention as "a practice which enjoys a long 
history of unbroken observance, in respect of which there is a 
strong sense of obligation, and which forms an integral part of 
the constitutional order" (p. 13). Hence, "reliance on convention 
makes the constitution more rigid and more fixed, not more 
flexible" (p. 14).8 
The more important aspect of flexibility, however, stems 
from the sovereignty of Parliament: "Parliament may make or 
un-make any law whatsoever, and nobody has the power to 
override or to set aside Parliament's legislation." As Professor 
Tomkins explains, "[t)he consequence of this doctrine is that 
nothing is entrenched: there is nothing which cannot be undone; 
no law which cannot be unmade" (p. 17).9 But Tomkins insists 
that "[t)here is no necessary connection between the constitution 
being unwritten and it being unentrenched" (p. 18). A written 
constitution, for example, might contain a provision allowing 
amendment by the same legislative procedure needed to pass 
ordinary legislation, and an unwritten constitution might none-
theless include a principle of basic human rights not susceptible 
to legislative override. 
This may be a surprising line of argument for American 
readers, who tend to equate the United States Constitution's su-
premacy over ordinary lawmaking with its written-ness. John 
Marshall's opinion in Marbury, for instance, asked "[t)o what 
purpose are [Congress's] powers limited, and to what purpose is 
that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any 
8. Nor is there any necessary connection between reliance on convention and an 
unwritten constitution. As Professor Tomkins notes, one might well include such princi-
ples as ministerial responsibility in a codified written constitution, then use convention to 
flesh them out (p. 12). 
9. Cf. United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 872-73 (1996) (plurality opinion) 
(observing that America's adoption of an entrenched constitution also makes it possible, 
in some circumstances, for one Congress to bind its successors). 
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time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?" 10 And yet it 
is plain that, even within our own political culture, many states 
have written constitutions without committing to anywhere near 
the same degree of entrenchment; the Texas constitution, for ex-
ample, has been amended over 300 times. 11 The utility of Profes-
sor Tomkins's discussion is to identify the constitutive function 
of a constitution- the establishment of governmental institutions 
and the regulation of their relations one with another and with 
their citizens-as central, with the obduracy of those arrange-
ments in the face of efforts to change them being a separate and 
optional feature. The Reform Acts of 1832 and 1869 and the 
Devolution Acts of 1998 "constitute" the legislative franchise 
and rudimentary elements of a federal structure in much the 
same way that Article I and the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution do; the English measures are thus "constitutional" 
in their import despite the fact that they can be changed tomor-
row. 
To my mind, Professor Tomkins exaggerates somewhat 
when he suggests there is little relation between written-ness and 
entrenchment. The scattered writings of the English Constitution 
reflect its commitment to Parliamentary sovereignty; to find the 
constitutive elements of the governmental structure, one must 
consult recent legislation like the Devolution Acts as well as an-
cient texts like Magna Carta, precisely because the later acts 
have the capacity to override the prior ones. But the fact that the 
United States Constitution purports to perform these constitu-
tive tasks in one document-that it is a codified written constitu-
tion, in Tomkins's terms-may itself foster at least a weak form 
of entrenchment. Republican majorities in Congress cannot clear 
the way for Arnold Schwarzenegger to seek the Presidency sim-
ply by passing a statute that will supersede Article ll's require-
ment that a president must have been born in the U.S.; they 
must amend the original document so that the Constitution will 
continue to reflect our basic governmental arrangements. Cer-
tainly one can imagine a version of Article V that would permit 
amendment by the same process as is used for ordinary legisla-
tion. But given the strong political, even cultural aversion to 
tampering with basic governing arrangements,12 I suspect that 
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (emphasis added). 
II. See John Randolph Prince, The Naked Emperor: The Second Amendment and 
the Failure of Origina/ism, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 659, 669-70 (2002) (collecting numbers on 
amendments to various state constitutions). 
12. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, What's Wrong with Constitutional Amendments, 
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requiring that a change be presented and voted upon as an al-
teration of the Constitution rather than simply ordinary legisla-
tion would raise the bar substantially. 13 
This seems to be the theory of provisions like Article 33 of 
the Canadian Constitution, which provides that the Parliament 
or provincial legislatures may legislate notwithstanding constitu-
tional prohibitions, but only if they expressly declare that they 
are doing so. 14 The experience under Article 33 is mixed, with an 
initial period of relatively frequent resort to the process, espe-
cially by Quebec, followed by a more recent trend of increased 
reluctance. But the overall record seems consistent with the in-
tuition that measures derogating from a written constitution will 
not be undertaken with the same frequency or political ease as 
ordinary legislation.15 That suggests that some degree of en-
trenchment follows from collecting constitutive principles in one 
place and calling them a constitution. John Marshall's admoni-
tion that "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are 
expounding"16 is typically cited as an argument for flexibility, but 
it also carries something of the opposing connotation-that is, 
that even the growth of an evolving constitution entails some-
thing weightier, and likely slower and more difficult, than ordi-
nary legal change. 
To say that entrenchment and codification are not com-
pletely unrelated, however, is not to deny the usefulness of Pro-
fessor Tomkins's insistence that they be considered separately. 
The distinction may suggest fruitful lines for future inquiry: For 
instance, should all parts of a constitution be entrenched (or not 
in GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS: DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 39 (1999). For a critique of this aversion to amendment, see 
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law, in 
THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
STATE (Richard Bauman & Tzvi Kahana, eds., forthcoming 2006). 
13. Cf Frank I. Michelman, What Do Constitutions Do that Statutes Don't (Legally 
Speaking)? in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH, supra note 12 (discussing the relation of 
supremacy and entrenchment). There is, of course, a chicken and egg problem here: It is 
not obvious that this cultural aversion would exist if Article V did not strongly suggest, 
by setting the bar so high, that amendments are not to be undertaken lightly. 
14. See Constitution Act of 1982, Art. 33(1) ("Parliament or the legislature of a 
province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case 
may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision in-
cluded in section 2 or section 7 to 15 of this Charter."). 
15. See Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-
and-Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 832-33 (2003) ("The 
quite limited use of section 33 itself suggests that there is little difference between the 
Canadian system and one in which the Constitutional Court's decisions are final."). 
16. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819). 
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entrenched) to the same degree? One could argue that the U.S. 
Constitution, for example, reflects varying degrees of entrench-
ment in practice, from the equal Senate representation clause, 
which arguably would require at least two amendments to 
change, 17 to textually-determinate provisions like the presiden-
tial age requirement that are relatively resistant to evolution 
through judicial interpretation,18 to more open-ended provisions 
like "due process" that have evolved in a common-law fashion/ 9 
to provisions like "cruel and unusual" which seem to invite such 
evolution by (at least arguably) referring explicitly to a present 
state of affairs.Z0 This may or may not be a good thing, but to 
think about it intelligently we need to separate the notion of 
"constituting" a government from a particular degree of en-
trenchment. 
More important, separating out the notion of entrenchment 
allows us to focus on what constitutions do in a political soci-
ety-that is, it permits a functional definition of "the constitu-
tion" that is distinct from a more conventional one that might 
amount to "the part of our arrangements that we can't change 
without going through the Article V process." The absence not 
only of entrenchment but also codification in Britain makes this 
issue a particularly stark one: As Professor Tomkins points out, 
"constitutional law is not sharply demarcated from other areas 
of law" in Britain (p. 16). What counts as "constitutional" is a 
matter of function: any statute, regulation, or convention that 
"creat[es] the institutions of the State," "regulate[s] the relations 
between those institutions," or "regulate[s] the relations be-
tween those institutions and the people" (p. 3) is a part of the 
Constitution. 
This notion of entrenchment has an important analytical 
payoff in the American system, where the presence of a central 
17. See U.S. CONST. art. V ("[N)o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its 
equal Suffrage in the Senate."). 
18. But see Sanford Levinson, "PerpetiUll Union," "Free Love," and Secession: On 
the Limits to the "Consent of the Governed," 39 TULSA L. REV. 457,463 (2004) (suggest· 
ing that the age provision is not as determinate as we might think, because "we are not 
told within the text whether the thirty-five year age requirement for presidential eligibil-
ity should be computed by reference to a solar or a lunar calendar"). 
19. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755-73 (1997) (Souter, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). 
20. Cf Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (noting that the "objective com-
ponent of an Eighth Amendment claim is ... contextual and responsive to 'contempo-
rary standards of decency"'); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 873 (1988) (Scalia, 
1., dissenting) (linking the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine to the Eighth 
Amendment's text). 
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document that purports to codify our constitutional arrange-
ments has often obscured the constitutional functions of other 
laws and practices. Consider, for instance, the two pillars of 
American judicial federalism: the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tomp-
kins, stating that federal courts generally lack power to fashion 
federal common law rules of decision/' and the rule of Murdock 
v. Memphis, providing that state courts have the final say over 
the substantive content of state law.22 Justice Brandeis's opinion 
in Erie explicitly rested on the Constitution, while Justice 
Miller's opinion in Murdock purported only to construe the Ju-
diciary Act of 1867.23 But how much does this difference matter? 
It certainly matters for purposes of entrenchment: Congress 
could presumably override Murdock by statute, but not Erie.24 
But if we set entrenchment to one side, does it make sense to say 
that Murdock does not announce a "constitutional" rule? It cer-
tainly constitutes the relationship between state and federal 
courts, and indeed between state and federal law, in every bit as 
fundamental a way as Erie does.25 
Many other statutes, executive orders and regulations, and 
practices perform "constitutional" functions in the sense that 
they constitute the government and govern its internal and ex-
ternal relations. Harold Koh has argued that our "National Se-
21. 304 u.s. 64 (1938). 
22. 87 u.s. 590 (1874). 
23. Compare Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78 ("If only a question of statutory construction 
were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied 
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now 
been made clear, and compels us to do so.") with Murdock, 87 U.S. at 633 ("[W]e are of 
opinion that the act of 1867 does not confer such a jurisdiction [to "examine and decide 
other questions not of a Federal character"]. This renders unnecessary a decision of the 
question whether, if Congress had conferred such authority, the act would have been 
constitutional."). There are still people who want to say that Erie was a statutory case, 
but it is hard to imagine a more explicit statement specifying the constitutional ground of 
decision. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78. See also, e.g., EDWARD PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND 
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLmCS OF 
THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 172-77 (2000); Henry J. 
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
383, 385-86 (1964). 
24. Congress could surely delegate broad substantive lawmaking authority to the 
federal courts in particular areas, so long as it set forth an "intelligible principle" to guide 
the exercise of that authority. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 
(2001). But that would satisfy the holding of Erie, not reverse it. It would be quite an-
other thing to pass a statute providing simply that the federal courts may formulate sub-
stantive rules of decision in all cases otherwise within their jurisdiction. 
25. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 883, 921-22 (1986) ("It is ... because of Murdock that the whole concept 
of state law as distinct from federal law is a meaningful one .... Erie and Murdock to-
gether ... give states control over their own law in a way we unquestionably presuppose 
them having today."). 
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curity Constitution" is composed primarily of "framework stat-
utes" like the National Security Act of 1947 or the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act.26 The Administrative Proce-
dure Act is surely part of the "constitution" of our modern regu-
latory state, providing both judicial checks on agency power as a 
substitute for the more traditionally constitutional (but defunct) 
delegation doctrine and protection of individual rights against 
agencies in many circumstances.27 Elena Kagan has shown that 
more recent executive practices associated with "presidential 
administration" -chiefly the involvement of White House offi-
cials in agency policy making and the President's efforts to take 
credit for the resulting policies-likewise perform important 
constitutional functions by facilitating accountability in the ad-
ministrative process.28 An even more obvious example would be 
the executive orders providing for regulatory review by the Of-
fice of Management and Budget/9 which altered the shape of the 
administrative state without any statutory enactment, much less 
a constitutional amendment. 
Or consider the allocation of power between the nation and 
the states. Cases like Lopez and Morrison notwithstanding,30 we 
live in a world of largely concurrent state and national regulatory 
powers. As a result, the boundary between state and national 
power will generally be set by the choices of federal legislators 
and officials-sometimes negotiated with state officials, some-
times simply imposed on them-to prescribe federal regulations 
in some areas, to refrain from interfering with state autonomy in 
others, and to share authority in still others. The Communica-
tions Act of 1934, for example, not only created the Federal 
Communications Commission but also drew a national/state 
boundary between long-distance and local telephony that was 
different than the line that would likely have been drawn under 
26. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 69-70 (1990). 
27. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1679 (1975). 
28. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245 (2001). 
29. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec. Order No. 
12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 4, 1985). See generally Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas 
H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986). 
30. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the federal Gun 
Free School Zones Act as outside the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce 
Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down portions of the 
federal Violence Against Women Act for similar reasons). 
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the Commerce Clause.31 And cooperative federalism arrange-
ments like those existing under national environmental statutes 
like the Clean Air and Water Acts-arrangements that are en-
tirely creatures of statute and regulation-define aspects of our 
federal structure that dwarf in practical importance those aspects 
governed by the Constitution itself.32 
One could give many other examples. The point, though, 
should already be clear: A functional definition of "the constitu-
tion" of the United States would have to take in a great many 
things besides the provisions of the Philadelphia document, as 
formally amended. This has at least two important implications 
for American debates. The first is a challenge to textualism. Em-
phasizing the incompleteness of even those constitutions that as-
pire to codification, Professor Tomkins argues that 
"[c]onstitutional questions, which change over time, are too var-
ied and too unpredictable for any single legal instrument to be 
capable of answering them all" (p. 9). A textualist might not 
quarrel with the proposition that many statutes, regulations, and 
practices outside the central text "constitute" our government, 
but still insist that matters governed by that central text itself be 
interpreted according to textualist methodologies. But if all 
these constitutional principles- that is, the ones in the central 
text and the ones found in constitutive measures and practices 
elsewhere- are serving the same ends, and indeed dealing in an 
interrelated way with the same concerns, then how can it make 
sense to focus only on the central text in virtually any case? And 
this criticism seems particularly true if the reason for the luxuri-
ant grown of uncodified constitutional provisions is the inevita-
ble limit of human foresight in the drafting of the central consti-
tutional text.33 
Consider, for example, the question of in what circum-
stances the Constitution requires congressional authorization for 
the use of military force. Some commentators have attempted to 
answer this question wholly by reference to the original under-
31. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b). 
32. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: 
Lessons from Environmental Regulation, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 203, 
216-18. I discuss these matters in somewhat more detail in Ernest A. Young, What British 
Devolutionaries Should Know About American Federalism, in PAlTERNS OF REGIONALISM 
AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE U.K. (Basil Markesinis & Jorg Fedtke eds., 2005). 
33. For a similar critique of reliance on the original understanding of a single text 
conceived at an isolated point in time, see Ernest A. Young, Rediscovering Conservatism· 
Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994). 
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standing of the text in Articles I and II of the Constitution.34 
And yet there are any number of statutes and practices that are 
"constitutive" of American war powers, in the sense that they 
structure and regulate the use of those powers. These might in-
clude such things as the War Powers Resolution, the Congress's 
internal arrangements for oversight of the military and intelli-
gence forces, and the chains of command and deliberation pro-
cedures established within the military and the civilian executive 
branch. If these arrangements serve the constitutive function of 
implementing the war powers, then there is a strong argument 
for considering them as part of the relevant legal background for 
answering unresolved questions about those powers.35 
The second and more important implication is to expand 
the horizons of our current debates about constitutional law. In 
my own specialty of constitutional federalism, for example, de-
bate has focused on the implications of a relatively small set of 
cases construing the Commerce Clause, the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments, and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment 
for the balance between state and national authority. As I have 
argued at great length elsewhere,36 however, the most important 
cases for the survival of meaningful state autonomy have gener-
ally concerned the extent to which particular federal statutes 
preempt state regulation. Likewise, some of the most important 
cases for individual rights in this country have concerned matters 
like the reach of the federal habeas corfus statute,37 the Voting 
Rights Act,38 and the immigration laws.3 
If, for example, the Clean Air Act's allocation of authority 
over air pollution policy between the national and state govern-
ments is "constitutive" of the federal relationship in that area, 
then we should forthrightly recognize that constitutional values 
34. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. Clu. L. REV. 
1543 (2002). 
35. These supplemental sources need not all be presentist in their orientation. It is 
common for originalists to consider institutional arrangements in the Founding period as 
a guide to the original understanding of the constitutional text. But how different is that 
from saying that these institutional arrangements-say, the early statutory provisions 
regulating the military or the practices of early presidents-are likewise part of the con-
stitutional backdrop that an originalist must interpret? 
36. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Coun's Two Federalisms, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
37. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 
(1952). 
38. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
39. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration 
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory In-
terpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). 
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are at stake in statutory cases interpreting the Act's provisions. 
This is what Justice Breyer was getting at when he pointed out, 
in an ERISA preemption case, that "the true test of federalist 
principle may lie ... in those many statutory cases where courts 
interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of 
the law."40 Recognizing the constitutional values at stake in 
these sorts of statutory cases can, in turn, bolster the argument 
for rules of construction grounded in those values rather than in 
Congress's imputed (and often fictional) intent.41 In any event, 
Professor Tomkins's study of English public law, in which statu-
tory matters are readily recognized as having constitutional im-
plications, can help us see the profound constitutional issues 
lurking in these statutory disputes. 
B. LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS 
For Professor Tomkins, the distinction between written and 
unwritten constitutions is far less important than that between 
legal and political constitutions: 
A political constitution is one in which those who exercise po-
litical power . . . are held to constitutional account through 
political means, and through political institutions .... A legal 
constitution, on the other hand, is one which imagines that the 
principle means, and the principal institution, through which 
the government is held to account is the law and the court-
room (pp. 18-19). 
For most of its history, English public law has emphasized the 
political aspects of the constitution. As Tomkins explains, the 
tradition exemplified by A.V. Dicey's treatise in the 191h cen-
tury42 relied heavily on the common law and resisted the devel-
opment of a separate administrative or constitutional law that 
would apply only to government. The result was that "the legal 
constitution struggled to take hold as the animating idea of Eng-
lish public law" (p. 23). 
This aspect of English constitutionalism has recently come 
under pressure, however, from three sources: the introduction 
into the British legal system of European law, emanating both 
from the European Community and the European Convention 
40. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
41. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the 
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 155~51 (2000). 
42. See A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUcriON TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1885) (10,. ed. 1959). 
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on Human Rights (p. 23); a changeover in the English judiciary 
from judges steeped in the Diceyan tradition to those influenced 
by more legalistic notions now prevalent in the law schools (p. 
24); and the fact that, in recent years, "the political constitution 
has come to be widely seen as having broken down" (p. 24). 
These trends have resulted in a greater emphasis on courts and 
judicial review in contemporary public law. Professor Tomkins 
cites, as a central example, the House of Lords' decision in the 
Fire Brigades case, in which the Law Lords held that the Home 
Secretary had acted illegally by deciding not to implement a 
statute duly enacted by Parliament and, instead, replacing it with 
a reviewed measure adopted by the government as secondary 
legislation.43 Traditionally, accountability for such an action 
would have been left to Parliament. Tomkins views the Law 
Lords' decision to intervene instead as "giv[ing] up on [the po-
litical constitution] and hand[ing] over to the courts the job of 
keeping the executive in line" (p. 30). 
Professor Tomkins is a big fan of the political constitution. 
Elsewhere, he has announced that "[t]he political constitution, 
and indeed politics generally, are in need of both defending and 
praising. "44 He thus views the trend in English public law toward 
more legalistic models of constitutionalism with considerable 
skepticism and concern. Tomkins emphasizes three "fault lines" 
in the legal constitution, one of which is the familiar (to Ameri-
can readers) concern about the undemocratic nature of judicial 
review: "Why should it be to the unrepresentative and-still-
overwhelmingly old, white, male, upper-middle class judges that 
we turn when we desire to hold the democratically elected gov-
ernment to account?" (p. 209). At least in Public Law,45 how-
ever, he seems equally concerned about the efficacy of judicial 
review in facilitating government accountability. His other two 
"fault lines"- the "capacity" and "potency" of the courts-
center on the continuing exclusion of judicial review from many 
43. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades 
Union (1995) 2 A. C. 513. Other prominent examples include M. v. Home Office (1994) 1 
A. C. 377 (holding an officer of the Crown in contempt of court); Council of Civil Service 
Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (1985) A.C. 374 (refining and summarizing the 
"heads" of judicial review); and Regina (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment [2001] 2 A. C. 532 (applying a doctrine of proportionality to invalidate a prison 
policy on searches of inmates' cells). 
44. Adam Tomkins, In Defence of the Political ConstitUJion, 22 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 
157, 157 (2002) (reviewing MARTIN LoUGHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND POLmCS (2000)). 
45. Professor Tomkins' other writings stress the civic republican value of politics. 
See id. at 172-75; ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005). 
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areas of government action and the limited remedies available 
against government actors (pp. 206-09). Tomkins thus rejects the 
assumption of legal constitutionalists "that no constitutional 
problem is solved unless or until it is judicially solved, and that 
there is no constitutional problem that cannot be successfully 
solved by the judiciary." These assumptions, he warns, both 
"dangerously underplay the significant role that political ac-
countability ... can and should continue to play" and "exagger-
ate the contribution that it is reasonable to expect the law to be 
able to make" (p. 210). 
The "political" constitution seems to have a somewhat dif-
ferent meaning for Professor Tomkins than it generally does in 
American discourse. For most American readers, I suspect the 
term "political constitution" will bring one of two notions to 
mind. One is the claim that political actors have their own inde-
pendent interpretive authority. Larry Kramer has argued, for ex-
ample, that for most of our history, "[f]inal interpretive authority 
rested with 'the people themselves,' and courts no less than 
elected representatives were subordinate to their judgments. "46 
This view resists the privileging of judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution; it thus tends to reject the holdings of cases like City 
of Boerne v. Flores,41 in which the Supreme Court struck down 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), enacted under 
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, on the 
ground that Congress's view of what the Amendment required, 
as embodied in the statute, went further than the Court's. 
The second notion is that many constitutional values are 
protected by political dynamics more broadly than they are by 
hard constitutional rules. Herbert Wechsler's "political safe-
guards of federalism,'' 48 for example, postulated that the struc-
tural composition of the Congress would create political incen-
tives to preserve state autonomy even in areas that fall within 
the potential authority granted to Congress by the Constitution. 
We see a clear case of this, I think, in Section 152(b) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, which foreclosed FCC jurisdiction 
over local telephone service even if such service fell within the 
46. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPUlAR CoNS1TIUilONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REviEW 8 (2004). 
47. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 142-44 (2001) (criticizing Boerne). 
48. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543 (1954). 
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constitutional definition of interstate commerce.49 One can think 
of this dynamic as "interpretation" in some broad sense: The 
Congress that enacted the Communications Act was "interpret-
ing" the proper balance of federalism in the area of telephone 
service. But what is being interpreted is not the bounds of consti-
tutional compulsion. It might fit better to say that constitutional 
understandings are sometimes "implemented"50 by political de-
cisions rather than by rules derived from the central constitu-
tional text. 
Professor Tomkins, on the other hand, seems to take a nar-
rower view of the "political constitution" that focuses wholly on 
enforcement. American debates about supremacy in interpreting 
a higher law that binds both court and legislature alike-the first 
notion discussed above-make little sense in a regime of parlia-
mentary sovereignty, although we might someday see parallel 
English disputes about authority to interpret the elements of 
higher law that are slowly being assimilated into the system, such 
as the European Convention on Human Rights. And Tomkins 
seems to reject the second notion-that the political constitution 
includes implementation of constitutional values through stat-
utes, regulations, or other practices that are products of the or-
dinary political process-as well. On this view, many aspects of 
English public law-such as the enactment of the Human Rights 
Act or Parliament's decision to devolve some legislative author-
ity to Scotland-would be manifestations of the "political consti-
tution." But for Tomkins the crucial question seems to be 
whether the ultimate enforcement of constitutional principle 
comes from a court. The American Communications Act and the 
British Devolution Acts, after all, both contain provisions en-
forceable by the judiciary. 51 Tomkins's paradigm case of political 
constitutionalism, by contrast, is the doctrine of ministerial re-
sponsibility, which holds that "Ministers are personally liable to 
Parliament for the quality and success of their policies" -that is, 
subject to political demands for "explanation, apology, and, in 
the most serious cases, resignation" (p. 140). 
49. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b). 
50. Cf RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001). 
51. See Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8" Cir. 1997) (holding that§ 152(b) 
foreclosed the FCC from issuing rules concerning the introduction of competition into 
~oc~I.telephone markets), rev'd, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). On the provisions for at least partial 
JUdiCial enforcement of the Devolution Acts, see Young, British Devolutionaries, supra 
note 32. 
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This English emphasis on purely political enforcement of 
constitutional principles can serve, I think, as a helpful corrective 
to two unfortunate tendencies in American debates about consti-
tutional interpretation "outside the courts." One is the occa-
sional statement by the judiciary suggestinfi that the Constitution 
means whatever the judiciary says it does. There are numerous 
sites of constitutional interpretation, however, in which the 
courts play no role, and in these situations some other actors will 
be, in Justice Jackson's memorable phrase, "infallible because 
[they] are final."53 Where the President enforces his interpreta-
tion of the Constitution politically by vetoing a statute he thinks 
unconstitutional, or by pardoning someone convicted under that 
statute, it is he who has the last word on what the Constitution 
means in that circumstance. Professor Tomkins's focus on in-
stances of purely political enforcement of the constitution may 
help remind American readers that similar instances exist 
throughout our own system. It may also remind us to question 
the converse idea that where no court can rule, there is therefore 
no constitutional constraint. 54 
The second tendency shows up in critics of judicial suprem-
acy who suggest that the courts should defer to Congress's inter-
pretation of the Constitution, even when the courts are called 
upon to enforce that interpretation. Congress enacted the 
RFRA, for example, to enforce its interpretation of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the First Amendment, as incorporated in the 
Fourteenth. But Congress's power to enact the RFRA depended 
upon its being a measure to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and it was no surprise that the local governmental defen-
dant in Boerne-a suit to enforce the RFRA in court-argued 
that the law exceeded that power because Congress had over-
read the Free Exercise Clause.55 In my view, even a hard-core 
departmentalist-that is, someone who believes that each branch 
of government must interpret the Constitution for itself when 
called upon to do so in the course of its ordinary duties- should 
say that a court confronted with such an argument must resolve 
52. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Professor Tomkins himself falls 
into this trap when he says that "[t)he constitutional order of the United States of Amer-
ica is such that it is the US Supreme Court which has the last word" (p. 4). 
53. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,540 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result). 
54. For instance, one might insist that there are constitutional limits on the war 
power even though it is unlikely that a court will ever be persuaded to confront the 
President by ruling on the question. 
55. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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it without deferring to Congress's reading of Free Exercise.56 
The important thing-which Professor Tomkins's distinction be-
tween legal and political enforcement helps illuminate-is that in 
this case a court is acting. 
Professor Tomkins's broader point, though, is the superior-
ity of political mechanisms for resolving constitutional disputes. 
The increased salience of such mechanisms in English public law 
is, in his view, one of the English model's chief attractions vis a 
vis the American. This point comes through most clearly in a 
separate essay in which Tomkins discusses the disputed Ameri-
can presidential election of 2000. The "sorrowful episode" of 
Bush v. Gore, he says, showed the "ugliness" of "the legal system 
and its judicial enforcers. "57 Tomkins suggests that, had a simi-
larly close election in Britain resulted in a hung Parliament, "the 
constitutional expectation would normally be ... that the leaders 
of the principal political parties would negotiate a settlement 
which was likely to attract the support of a majority of MPs. "58 
Although recalcitrance on the part of those leaders might re-
quire unusual measures, it is clear that "the courts would be kept 
well out of it, and the decision-makers ... would be both democ-
ratically elected and politically accountable actors. "59 
Put aside the question whether a "political" resolution of 
the 2000 election by Tom Delay's House of Representatives 
would have been any less "ugly" or "sorrowful." The question is 
56. I have elaborated this argument elsewhere. See Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Fal-
ling on the Federal Government? State Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and 
the Federal Balance, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1551 (2003) (book review). On departmentalism, 
see, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitu-
tional Interpreter, 48 REV. PoLmcs 401,411-12 (1986). 
57. Tomkins, Political Constitution, supra note 44, at 170. Professor Tomkins relies 
heavily on Justice Stevens's dissent, which lamented that the "perfectly clear" "loser" of 
the election was "the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the 
rule of law." 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But public opinion polls 
after the Court's decision showed either narrow decreases or even increases in public 
confidence in the Court, and continuing high absolute levels of such confidence overall. 
See, e.g., Richard Benedetto, It's Time to Move On, People Say Americans Relieved Fight 
is Finally Over, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 2000, at 8A; Richard Morin & Oaudia Deane, 
Public Backs Uniform U.S. Voting Rules, WASH. POST, Dec. 18,2000, at A1; Janet Elder, 
Poll Shows Americans Divided Over Election, Indicating that Bush Must Build Public 
Suppon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,2000, at A22. There thus seems to be some truth to Judge 
Posner's observation that "Bush v Gore may have done less harm to the nation by reduc-
ing the Supreme Court's prestige than it did good for the nation by averting a significant 
probability of a presidential selection process that would have undermined the presi-
dency and embittered American politics more than the decision itself did or is likely to 
do." Richard A. Posner, Florida 2()()(): A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election 
Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 54. 
58. Tomkins, Political Constitution, supra note 44, at 170-71. 
59. /d. at 171. 
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whether the British comparison really proves that political en-
forcement can resolve even these most intractable disputes. One 
problem with the analogy is that Professor Tomkins has a safety 
valve for his political dispute that was unavailable to the partici-
pants in the U.S. election of 2000: the Queen. If the leaders of 
the British political parties could not agree on who should as-
sume the office of Prime Minister, the question would be re-
solved by a neutral and authoritative decisionmaker.60 In the 
American case, the parties could have played out the Twelfth 
Amendment procedure for resolving election disputes in the 
House of Representatives.61 As Judge Posner has pointed out, 
however, there is substantial likelihood that further political dis-
putes about the appropriate process would have arisen at that 
point, raising once again the need for an authoritative and neu-
tral decisionmaker.62 The British disputants in Tomkins's hypo-
thetical have not avoided the need to look outside of ordinary 
politics to solve their problem; rather, they can simply appeal to 
a different actor. 
Still, I think Professor Tomkins has a point about the rela-
tive willingness of American and British actors to resort to legal-
istic solutions. Stated broadly, the English notion of convention 
is that some things are "not done" even though the legal consti-
tution permits them. But one of the most striking things about 
American politics today is the extent to which these "conven-
tional" notions of restraint seem to have broken down. Consider 
the shenanigans of the last decade: a government shutdown 
(1996), imposition of limits on federal court jurisdiction (1996), a 
presidential impeachment (1997), a iitigated presidential election 
(2000), filibusters of lower court judges (2003-04), and numerous 
wartime measures that stretch independent presidential author-
ity to (and perhaps past) its limit (2001-04). I do not contend 
that the present period is unique in our history; the Federalists 
and the Jeffersonians were not exactly cordial, either. I do think 
that the level of conventional restraint at the current time is un-
usually low. 
60. See id. at 171. As Professor Tomkins points out, id. at 172, British party leaders 
would be extremely reluctant to allow the Queen to make this choice, and this reluctance 
would increase the pressure for political compromise. But at least in prior disputed 
American elections, the principal actors have likewise been reluctant to involve the 
courts for similar reasons. 
61. See generally Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who's Afraid of the 
Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925 (2001). 
62. Posner, supra note 57, at 43--44. 
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To be sure, many of my examples are themselves "political" 
actions rather than legal ones. But even such measures as the 
Clinton impeachment and the Senate's more recent judicial fili-
busters suggest a preference for legalistic remedies. Impeach-
ment itself casts Representatives as lawyers and Senators as 
judges, and the process went forward only because President 
Clinton resisted political pressure to resign and the House Re-
publicans rejected the option of simply seeking to punish the 
President's party at the polls. Likewise, the importance of judi-
cial nominations-and hence the willingness to "go to the mat-
tresses"63 over them-is highest when we expect that basic social 
controversies will be settled in the courts. And the current Presi-
dent's multiple decisions to do things like detain citizens indefi-
nitely and try suspected terrorists before military commissions 
without seeking Congressional authorization have the effect of 
shifting debate over those decisions from legislative to judicial 
fora.64 Not every "political" act strengthens the political constitu-
tion. 
All of these acts suggest that government actors are pushing 
their constitutional options as far as they can go, rather than 
feeling constrained by politics to do something short of what 
they might do, legally speaking. It is primarily in this sense that 
recent events suggest that the American political constitution 
has relatively little force. What we may be experiencing is a 
variation on James Bradley Thayer's concern that aggressive ju-
dicial review would encourage lefislators to ignore the constitu-
tion in their own deliberations.6 Every lawyer knows that the 
posture of a judge toward a disputed legal question is quite dif-
ferent from that of a litigant. A view which stresses the political 
constitution, or "the constitution outside the courts," may en-
courage political actors to think of themselves not necessarily as 
63. See THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972). We have, in fact, been at the 
mattresses for a long time, since the present filibusters are part of a cycle of Republican 
delays of Democratic nominees, the earlier "Borking" of Republican nominees, etc. 
64. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (detentions); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (military commissions). One would not 
want to overstate the judicialization of these controversies, however. There is good rea-
son to believe that intensive constitutional debate in the media, in Congress, and even in 
academia has had a moderating effect on the Administration's policies, particularly as 
manifested in the regulations promulgated by the Department of Defense prescribing 
relatively generous procedural protections for defendants before military commissions. 
See Dep't of Def., Military Comm'n Order No. 1 (March 21, 2002), available at 
http:llwww.defenselink.mil/news!Aug2004/commissions_orders.html. 
65. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Consti· 
tutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155-56 (1893). 
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judges but at least as interpreters tasked with finding the "right 
answer" to a constitutional question. The judicialization of con-
stitutional disputes, on the other hand, encourages political ac-
tors to think like litigants-that is, to press the arguments advan-
tageous to them as far as they will go, and leave the discovery of 
right answers to the court.66 This is not to say that constitutional-
ism outside the courts will ever be perfectly disinterested or even 
particularly moderate in tone. But I do think that if parties to a 
political dispute over constitutional meaning expect ultimately to 
end up in court, the emphasis may shift from "What is our best 
interpretation of what the Constitution means?" to "What's the 
most advantageous reading that we can plausibly defend in 
court?" That can't be healthy. 
At the end of the day, Professor Tomkins's enthusiasm for 
political solutions will most likely seem a little excessive to 
American readers-particularly those who believe that legal en-
forcement of constitutional principle played an essential role in 
overturning such evils as racial segregation.67 As I suggest in Part 
11-and as Tomkins recognizes-there are reasons to doubt 
whether the political constitution can adequately hold the gov-
ernment to account even in England, much less in an America 
where the expectation that the courts will resolve many impor-
tant controversies is considerably more entrenched. Nonetheless, 
the basic thrust of Tomkins's account should remind us of 
Learned Hand's admonition that "a society so riven that the 
spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save . . . a society 
where that spirit flourishes, no court need save ... [and] in a so-
ciety which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts 
the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish. "68 
66. I do not mean to say that this is a good strategy, even for litigants. My mentors 
at Covington & Burling constantly stressed the need for the lawyers themselves to offer 
to courts a balanced interpretation of the law, both as part of their responsibilities as offi-
cers of the court and also as a self-interested way of maximizing the persuasiveness of 
their arguments to the judge. 
67. One need not believe that the courts had the efficacy to overturn segregation on 
their own, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (demonstrating that they did not), to think that they 
played an important role in prompting the necessary political and ~i~ changes. See, 
e.g., Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1992) (reVIewmg Rosenberg). 
Professor Tomkins has written that "(t)he freedom which politics invests in us ... (is) a 
freedom from domination," Tomkins, Political Constitution, supra note 44, at 172, but 
much of the critique of the civic republican position that Tomkins defends h~s been 
rooted in concerns about domination of one social group by others. See, e.g., Lmda K. 
Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L. J. 1663 (1988). 
68. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in 
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 172, 181 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952). 
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Much has been written about the polarization of American poli-
tics, but the somewhat narrower task for constitutional lawyers 
may be to think hard about how to revive the sense of political 
restraint that can make our political constitution more viable. 
C. AN ENGLISH VIEW OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Public Law has so little to say about American constitu-
tional law that it is hardly fair to evaluate it on its assessments of 
doings on this side of the Atlantic. Professor Tomkins's few 
comments on the subject, however, provide some interesting in-
sight into how our constitutional debates look from the outside. 
In the course of demonstrating that even a written constitution 
like ours cannot, without supplementation or elaboration, an-
swer all the questions put to it, Tomkins asserts that whether Bill 
Clinton's perjury amounted to a "high crime or misdemeanour" 
warranting impeachment was "the most pressing and important 
question[] that [was] asked of US constitutional law during the 
whole of the 1990s" (p. 8).69 That can't be right. Think of the 
other questions contending for the title: Should the constitu-
tional allocation of authority between the national government 
and the states be recalibrated (or restored)?70 Do homosexuals 
have rights to sexual autonomy and equal treatment?71 Should 
the Court's recognition of a woman's right to an abortion, and its 
substantive due process revolution more generally, be limited, 
expanded, or reconsidered?72 These are basic questions about 
the structure of the government and the relation of the individ-
ual to the state, and their lasting significance for constitutional 
law is obvious. 
It is hard to see the Clinton impeachment in the same light. 
The Johnson impeachment during Reconstruction served as a 
69. Professor Tomkins allows as how the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore 
might also be a strong contender for "the most important constitutional event in recent 
American history" (p. 8 n.S). But I would argue that this once again mistakes the sensa-
tional for the lastingly significant. The sui generis nature of the situation, the doctrinal 
narrowness of the Court's decision, and the Court's obvious reluctance to repeat its in-
tervention make it hard to compare Bush v. Gore to, say, Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 
significance. 
70. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
71. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
72. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
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forum for venting basic constitutional issues about the presi-
dent's power over his subordinates and the appropriate way to 
put the nation's pieces back together after a civil war/3 but what 
principles of equivalent importance were at stake in the Clinton 
episode? The latter strikes me as more akin to the old adage 
about academic politics: It was so nasty because so little-in 
terms of constitutional principle-was at stake. The fact that it 
came to impeachment does indicate, as I have already suggested, 
an important structural breakdown in notions of political re-
straint. But it seems to me that dragging out the heavy constitu-
tional artillery over some stains on a blue cocktail dress is a 
symptom of a period of intense partisan competition combined 
with disagreements of principle too minor to serve as adequate 
vehicles for that competition. 
In the end, Professor Tomkins's view of the Clinton im-
peachment's salience may tell us more about English constitu-
tional law than it does about our own. The impeachment raised 
no questions about the limits of presidential authority; no one, in 
other words, thought the President had the authority to lie under 
oath. It was instead a controversy about accountability; that is, 
the central issues concerned the circumstances under which the 
highest executive official might be removed from power. Per-
haps it should be unsurprising that English constitutionalists fo-
cus on the latter sort of issue. The English model, after all, con-
fers vast sovereign authority on the party in power, but checks 
that authority by permitting both the ouster of the government 
at the instant that it loses Parliament's confidence and the undo-
ing of all the prior regime's works by its successors in office. 
English public law, in this sense, is about accountability of lead-
ers rather than checks on their power to act.74 From that per-
spective, an American controversy about removing the President 
might understandably loom larger than disputes about the scope 
of congressional power or individual rights against government. 
The next Part explores in greater detail the English notions of 
accountability developed in Public Law. 
73. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 113-57 (1999). 
74. It is perhaps indicative of this tendency that The Economist's reaction to the 
Abu Ghraib torture scandal was to call for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to 
resign rather than for the strengthening of legal curbs on the interrogation of prisoners. 
See Resign, Rumsfeld, ECONOMIST, May 8, 2004, at 43. Obviously, one might have both 
limited authority and personal accountability at the same time, and perhaps Rumsfeld 
should have resigned. My point is simply that one would tend to lean more heavily on 
personal accountability where limits on authority are sparse. 
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II. WEST TO EAST 
I hope to have already conveyed some of what American 
constitutional lawyers might learn from Professor Tomkins's ele-
gant analysis of the English system. Can English public lawyers 
learn anything from America? As Ian Loveland observed a dec-
ade ago, "the United States has long been grappling with issues 
which are now being forced on to the British political agenda, 
and might thus be thought to offer valuable guidance ... to Brit-
ish lawmakers."75 In addressing this issue, I want to focus on two 
elements of Tomkins's argument: the dichotomy between politi-
cal and legal constitutions, and his fascinating development of 
the English separation of powers, which is quite different from 
our own. 
One might understand these two central components of 
Public Law as a forthright defense of the Westminster model of 
parliamentary democracy in the face of two tendencies. The first 
is an attempt, by emphasizing the legal constitution over the po-
litical, to move toward what Bruce Ackerman would call "con-
strained parliamentarianism"- that is, a Rarliament constrained 
by higher law enforceable by the courts. 6 The second is a revi-
sionist interpretation of the English separation of powers that 
finds within it a commitment to a tripartite division of legislative 
executive, and judicial functions. By rejecting these tendencies in 
favor of a relatively unadulterated Westminster model, Tomkins 
registers an important dissent from the apparent conventional 
wisdom that Westminster is outdated or otherwise undesirable. 77 
Professor Tomkins's defense of the Westminster model en-
courages us to take seriously an altogether different way of 
thinking about the separation of powers. This stark reminder 
that our American understandings of the subject are hardly in-
evitable may well be more important for readers west of the At-
lantic than any particular comparative insight to be gleaned from 
Public Law. There are, nonetheless, commonalities, and their 
75. Ian Loveland, Introduction, in A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP? AMERICAN 
INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC LAW IN THE UK 1,10 (ian Loveland, ed., 1995). 
76. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 
665 (2000). Professor Ackerman de-emphasizes the courts in the process of higher-law 
formation, see id. at 666-68, but it is clear that the courts play a primary role in the en-
forcement of higher law. See id. at 668 ("We will require a constitutional court to make 
the principles enacted by the people into operational realities."). He is thus a devotee of 
the "legal constitution" as Professor Tomkins defines it. 
77. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 15, at 813-14 (observing that "(t]wo models of 
constitutionalism were on offer in the last century," but that "(f]or all practical purposes, 
the Westminster model has been withdrawn from sale"). 
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usefulness may run in both directions. The remainder of this es-
say thus asks whether American experience can inform English 
constitutional debates. Again, I want to confine the role of com-
parative constitutional analysis chiefly to raising questions that 
must then be resolved within the English system; I don't pre-
sume to provide any answers. 
A. COLLABORATIVE ENFORCEMENT 
Professor Tomkins paints the dichotomy between political 
and legal constitutions as "a stark choice": "[D]o we want tore-
place our political constitution with a legal one?" (p. 30). I want 
to suggest, however, that the choice may not be as stark as all 
that. For one thing, it seems more accurate to say that we are 
choosing between legal and political mechanisms for enforcing 
one constitution (albeit with scattered components), rather than 
between two distinct constitutions. Moreover, political and legal 
enforcement are not unrelated, and each may affect the efficacy 
of the other. Courts may develop legal doctrines that buttress 
the political constitution, and political actors may take steps to 
facilitate legal enforcement of constitutional principles. One way 
forward from Tomkins's portrait of an increasingly frail political 
constitution coupled with a still-nascent (and perhaps undesir-
able) legal constitution would be to ask how those two flip-sides 
of English constitutionalism might each be employed to buttress 
the other. 
A great deal of the "legal" enforcement of the American 
Constitution is directed toward enhancing the operation of po-
litical checks. This is the main thrust, for example, of "process 
federalism."78 That approach takes as given that "political safe-
guards" such as the representation of the states in Congress or 
the procedural difficulty of making federal law will remain the 
most important checks on central authority.79 Process federalism 
acknowledges, however, that these political checks are imper-
fect, and it seeks to develop judicial doctrine to maintain or even 
improve their operation. The Court has thus employed "clear 
statement" rules of statutory construction, for example, to re-
quire that the states' defenders in Congress have clear notice of 
threatened impositions on state autonomy and to impose an ad-
78. See, e.g., Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 36, at 15-16. 
79. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Bradford 
R. Clark, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 19 TEX. L. REV. 1321 
(2001). 
2004] BOOK REVIEWS 795 
ditional drafting requirement on such legislation.80 Similar rules 
have required that national decisions to narrow state regulatory 
authority be made by actors, like Congress itself, that are ac-
countable to the states rather than by other actors, like adminis-
trative agencies, that are not.81 These sorts of process-forcing 
rules have played similar roles in the protection of individual 
rights.82 I have described these sorts of rules elsewhere as in-
stances of "collaborative enforcement"- that is, enforcement 
strategies that encourage one set of institutions, like courts, to 
develop practices that enhance the abilities of other institutions, 
like Congress, to implement constitutional norms that both insti-
tutions are committed to enforcing.83 
Collaborative enforcement also plays a role in Britain, not-
withstanding the sharp dichotomy between legal and political en-
forcement posed by Professor Tomkins. The impact of the new 
Human Rights Act (HRA), for example, appears to be twofold: 
It encourages English courts to interpret ambiguous statutes and 
secondary legislation in accord with the protected rights, and it 
empowers courts effectively to "remand" acts of Parliament that 
a court finds violative of the HRA back to the legislature for an-
other look (p. 122}. The relationship between Parliamentary 
sovereignty and European Union law will, in most cases, be simi-
lar: Even for Acts of Parliament passed subsequent to the Euro-
pean Communities Act of 1972 (ECA}, English courts construe 
those statutes-wherever possible-in conformity with Euro-
pean law (p. 111}.84 Both these arrangements strike this Ameri-
80. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
81. See, e.g., Solid Waste Auth. of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 
531 u.s. 159 (2001). 
82. See, e.g., Cass. R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 
(2000). 
83. See generally Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institu-
tional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733 
(2005). 
84. See also Paul Craig, Constitutional and Non-Constitutional Review, 54 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBS. 147, 162--64 (2001). The Factoname litigation raised the more difficult 
case of a clear conflict, and the English courts held that they could enjoin the enforce-
ment of an Act of Parliament inconsistent with European law. See Regina v. Secretary of 
State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No.2) (1991]1 AC 603. Professor Tomkins ties 
himself in knots trying to make this conclusion consistent with the doctrine of parliamen-
tary sovereignty. He says that the English court did not say that it could enjoin an Act of 
Parliament as a matter of English law; instead, the court was simply enforcing European 
law, which it was authorized to do by the ECA. Hence, "it remains the case that under 
English law nobody has the power to override or to set aside a statute, but it is no longer 
the case that English law is the only law that is applicable in England" (p. 118) . 
. I have to say that I find this completely unpersuasive. It is like saying that joining the 
Umted States did not compromise the sovereignty of the State of Texas, because it re-
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can observer as similar to a process-forcing "clear statement" re-
gime; they thus might fruitfully be viewed as ways in which the 
legal constitution operates in tandem with the political one. 
Collaborative enforcement can also operate in the opposite 
direction, with the legislature making a political decision that 
helps to facilitate the judicial enforcement of legal constraints. 
One might, for instance, understand the War Powers Resolution 
in this way. Judges encounter serious difficulties in assessing 
whether a particular military action amounts to a "war" that 
must be declared by Congress; the resolution, on the other hand, 
may be triggered simply by introducing the armed forces into 
"hostilities" or into foreign territory "equipped for combat."85 
The resolution may thus render certain war powers questions 
more susceptible of judicial resolution-and therefore less likely 
to be held non-justiciable-by imposin~ a more determinate 
standard than the Constitution itself does. 6 
Likewise, various bills in Congress have proposed interpre-
tive guidelines for courts construing the preemptive impact of 
national legislation on state regulatory autonomy.87 Although 
the power of Congress to prescribe interpretive rules for courts 
is not free from controversy, such guidelines would, at a mini-
mum, be relevant to the task of determining what Congress in-
tended on the issue of preemption. That would assist the courts 
mains the case that the Texas legislature (or the people of Texas by state constitutional 
amendment) can still set aside any prior law of Texas. The only change is that, by virtue 
of the national Supremacy Clause, Texas law is not the only law applicable in Texas. But 
who in the world cares whether Texas law is set aside as a matter of Texas law or as a 
matter of federal law? The point is that it can be-and frequently is-set aside. The same 
is true in Britain after Factortame: Acts of Parliament can be-and, in all likelihood, fre-
quently will be-set aside where they are in conflict with European law. It makes no 
more sense to deny that Parliament's sovereignty has been seriously narrowed than it 
does to insist that Texas remains just as sovereign as it was prior to its entry into the Un-
ion. 
85. 50 u.s.c. § 1543. 
86. Compare, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24-25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Sil-
berman, J., concurring) (concluding that neither the statutory nor the constitutional ques-
tion was justiciable), with id. at 37, 39 (Tate!, J., concurring) (concluding that both were 
justiciable, but suggesting that the statutory question was easier to resolve). A judicial 
determination that the resolution had been violated, of course, would leave much to de-
cide, including the constitutionality of the resolution itself and the appropriate remedy 
that might issue from a court. But a judicial declaration that the resolution had been trig-
gered and/or violated might, in itself, then help frame the terms of a decisive political 
debate about what to do about the situation. 
87. See, e.g., Federalism Enforcement Act of 1998, S. 2445, 105'" Cong. (1998); State 
Sovereignty Act of 1998, H.R. 4196, 105'" Cong. (1998). Neither of these bills passed, but 
the Executive Branch has promulgated a similar requirement, binding on administrative 
agencies that must interpret statutes, by Executive Order. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 
Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999). 
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in enforcing the dictate of the Supremacy Clause-part of the le-
gal constitution- by helping to specify the situations in which 
state laws should be considered in conflict with the supreme law 
of the land. 
As a last example, consider the basic federal civil rights 
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private right of action 
to enforce federal constitutional rights against state and local of-
ficials. Although state officials would be bound by federal consti-
tutional rights even in the absence of such a statute, the avail-
ability of a federal cause of action, a federal forum, and (under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988) a right for successful plaintiffs to recover at-
torneys' fees makes a tremendous difference in facilitating the 
enforcement of these rights. In the case of similar suits against 
federal officials, the Supreme Court has itself created an implied 
right of action for damages against federal officials.88 It seems 
fair to say, however, that the judicially-implied version of this 
cause of action has been far less helpful to persons whose rights 
have been violated than the statutory right of action against state 
and local officials.89 Section 1983 thus demonstrates the impor-
tance of political action to give teeth to the principles of the legal 
constitution. 
Again, English examples discussed by Professor Tomkins 
appear to fit this pattern. The Human Rights Act's relatively 
specific provisions, for example, operate in an area where the 
English courts had been groping toward judge-made, substantive 
due process-like restrictions on governmental action implicating 
individual rights. Parliament's decision to define those rights by 
statute thus may well enhance the role of the judiciary in enforc-
ing human rights both by lending Parliamentary sanction to such 
enforcement and by providing the courts with more determinate 
guideposts.90 My point is thus not to prescribe that English law 
88. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
u.s. 388 (1971). 
89. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
812-25 (5" ed. 2003) (noting the limited willingness of courts to expand the Bivens rem-
edy, and the extremely infrequent success of individual plaintiffs). 
90. The Human Rights Act's significance is more complex than this, however. It 
may, for instance, not only facilitate judicial review but also cabin its previously open-
ended character. Moreover, its passage was surely an effort not only to rationalize judi-
cial review within the British system but also to maximize compliance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
It is also worth noting that not all of the new rights-expanding reforms work through 
the courts. For example, the new Freedom of Information Act, which came into effect on 
January 1, 2005, operates by creating an independent commissioner of information to 
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follow American notions of collaborative enforcement, but 
rather to suggest that such notions may help provide a theory for 
what is already occurring in English public law and demonstrate 
that the choice between political and legal constitution is not as 
stark as Tomkins sometimes makes it sound. 
B. THE (REALLY) OLD SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The big problem with the mechanisms of collaborative en-
forcement that I have been discussing is that it is not at all clear 
how well they would work in a parliamentary system like Brit-
ain's. One cannot repeat often enough Vicki Jackson's caution 
that it is particularly difficult to derive positive prescriptions 
from comparative law when we are concerned with the structural 
components of a constitution; those components, after all, tend 
to be parts of "package deals," integrally connected to other in-
stitutional arrangements.91 It is thus dangerous to assume that 
clear statement rules, for example, would operate the same way 
in the context of the English separation of powers as they oper-
ate in America. 
The American model of collaborative enforcement, for ex-
ample, depends on enhancing political and procedural con-
straints that operate within the legislative process. A federalism-
protecting clear statement rule, for instance, may both mobilize 
defenders of state autonomy to oppose a legislative proposal and 
add to the burden of inertia that proponents must overcome by 
imposing additional drafting hurdles. One may wonder how ef-
fective these checks can be in a parliamentary system where 
party discipline minimizes the effect of both political opposition 
to the Government's legislative program and inertial barriers to 
legislative action. The point of the Westminster model, as Bruce 
Ackerman has explained, is to give "plenary authority" to the 
governing party.92 
enforce the act. Although there appears to be some eventual right of appeal to the 
courts, the process is primarily administrative in nature. See Freedom of Information Act 
2()()(}; Out of the Darkness, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 2005, at 11. 
91. See Vicki Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative 
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 273-74 (2001); see also Jonathan Zasloff, 
The Tyranny of Madison, 44 UCLA L. REV. 795 (1997) (urging caution before "export-
ing" American structures to foreign contexts). 
92. Ackerman, supra note 76, at 643; but see Tushnet, supra note 15, at 834 (arguing 
that the inertial checks on which "clear statement" and similar rules depend also exist in 
parliamentary systems). 
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One of the principal arguments of Public Law, however, is 
to insist on the viability and continued relevance of a separation 
of powers between Parliament and the Government. Professor 
Tomkins notes that a number of revisionist commentators have 
recently tried to argue that the English Constitution reflects a 
Montesquieuian separation of powers (pp. 38-39).93 Tomkins 
likewise thinks that England has a meaningful separation of 
powers, but he rejects ahistorical yearnings for Montesquieu and 
Madison in favor of a much older vision forged in the crucible of 
the constitutional crises of the 17th century. Tomkins writes that 
"[t]he seventeenth century was the formative period of the Eng-
lish constitution-our foundational moment." Hence, "[t]he 
English constitution was forged in the blood of civil war and its 
aftermath" (p. 45). And the separation of powers that emerged 
from that strife "is a separation between the Crown on the one 
hand, and Parliament on the other" (p. 44). 
This notion requires a good deal of explanation, especially 
for American readers used to thinking of the British monarch as 
a ceremonial figure whose primary function is to fuel the tourism 
and tabloid industries. Professor Tomkins insists that "[t]he 
monarch is no mere figureheard. As Queen, Elizabeth II has ex-
traordinary power," even in her personal capacity (p. 62).94 More 
important than the monarch's personal powers, however, is the 
power of "the Crown" -defined as the monarch and her minis-
ters, who make up "the Government." Tomkins's central notion 
of separation of powers rests on this tension between the Crown 
and the Parliament. It is tempting to view the Crown/Parliament 
distinction as tracking American notions of the Executive and 
Legislative branches, but Tomkins insists that this parallel is illu-
sory. Virtually all legislation, after all, is in fact proposed by the 
Government and then rubber-stamped by virtue of its command 
of a Parliamentary majority (p. 95). Parliament's more important 
roles are instead to "supply" the Government, both in the sense 
of raising revenue and by providing the members of the ministry 
from its own ranks, to "scrutinize" its activities through ques-
93. Tomkins cites COLIN MUNRO, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 328-32 (2d 
ed. 1999); T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
BRmSH CONSTITUTIONALISM (1993), and ERIC BARENDT, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1998). 
94. These powe~ include the power to choose the prime minister in the event of a 
hung parliament (in some circumstances), the power to "assent" to legislation, and cer-
~ain powe~ in dealing with the Commonwealth countries. The exercise of these powe~ 
IS, however, generally constrained tightly by convention (pp. 62-72). 
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tions and investigations, and to vote it out of office if Parlia-
ment's confidence in the ministry should fail (pp. 91-92). 
Professor Tomkins's 17th century account of the separation 
of powers is fascinating, although it remains somewhat difficult 
to get a firm fix on what makes it a meaningful check on the 
power of the Prime Minister. One can concede that Parliament 
has many ways of checking the Government, and that the Gov-
ernment remains dependent on Parliament, and yet it is hard to 
get around the fact that the Parliament and the Executive are 
basically the same people, at least at the top. Tomkins's notion 
thus seems to depend on creating some political and institutional 
separation between the Parliament itself and its members who 
make up the Government. Despite Tomkins's rejection of revi-
sionist appeals to Montesquieu and Madison, his own vision fol-
lows Federalist 51 in its dependence on the notion that different 
institutions of government will have strong competitive incen-
tives to check one another.95 But it is not clear that these incen-
tives exist in all circurnstances,96 particularly where the partici-
pants in competing institutions are united by bonds of party. We 
would expect that problem to reach its apogee in systems like 
Britain's, where strong party discipline is the norm. 
I am in no position, of course, to second-guess Professor 
Tomkins on the realities of British politics. And at least to a cas-
ual reader of the Economist, the notion of separation between 
Parliament and the Government does seem to have some pur-
chase in the present political dynamic. On the two issues of most 
interest to American observers, the most interesting divisions 
seem to be taking place within the major political parties. On the 
war in Iraq, Prime Minister Tony Blair has come close to out-
right rebellion from elements within the Labour party.97 Like-
wise, the extent to which Britain should seek to strengthen and 
further integrate itself into the European Union seems to divide 
both Labour and Conservative politicians.98 Such intra-party di-
95. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (James Madi-
son). 
96. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional 
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005) (arguing that one cannot assume that government 
institutions will always act to maximize their own power). 
97. See, e.g., Clare Loses It, ECONOMIST, May 17,2003, at 51. . . 
98. See, e.g., The Ties that Do Bind, ECONOMIST, May 24,2003, at 61 (d1scussmg the 
differences over Europe between Blair and Gordon Brown, the Labour Chancellor); The 
Europhiles' Rebel Yell, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 1997, at 56 (discussing splits in the Tory 
party over Europe). 
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visions would seem to have at least some potential to divide the 
party-in-Parliament from the party-in-Government. 
One wonders, however, how well the British system can 
function if meaningful separation between Parliament and the 
Government becomes a fixture of British politics. The basic 
problem would seem to be that the citizenry has no separate 
mechanism for holding the Parliament and the Government to 
account. If, for example, one is against the war in Iraq and lives 
in a constituency whose Labour MP has been actively engaged in 
holding the Blair Ministry to account for its involvement there, 
does one vote to return that MP at the next poll? A vote for the 
Labour MP, after all, is a vote for Tony Blair-the last, best 
friend of George Bush in an otherwise hostile world. There is, in 
other words, no separate mechanism for approving the actions of 
one's MP while disapproving of the Government formed by the 
same party; one cannot, as an Arizona Republican might do, 
vote for John McCain for the Senate but against George Bush 
for the presidency. 
The British system may also suffer from a more subtle 
handicap when it comes to fostering the sort of intra-party de-
bate that might allow the party-in-Parliament to function as a 
meaningful check on the party-in-Government. In the U.S. sys-
tem, the decentralization of the major parties is an important 
source of intra-party debate; in particular, the existence of state 
party organizations, some of which may be in power at the state 
level at any given time and therefore facing the need to actually 
govern, injects a much more diverse set of political perspectives 
than one might expect in a more unitary system. One of the pri-
mary forces for debate within the contemporary Republican 
party, for example, comes from the Republican governors of 
moderate to liberal states-people like Arnold Schwarzenegger 
in California, Mitt Romney in Massachusetts, and George Pataki 
in New York-who have argued that the party should move to 
the political center.99 Likewise, in the early 1990s, Governor Bill 
Clinton and other Democratic governors of more moderate 
states were able to mount a challenge to the national Democratic 
party establishment and move their party to the middle. Part of 
that diversifying impulse may well come from the fact that these 
governors face substantially different political circumstances and 
99. See, e.g., Joe Mathews & Megan Garvey, Stem Cell Research: Governor Breaks 
Ranks Toward Center, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at Al (discussing Governor Schwar· 
zenegger's support for ~ rnaj.or stern cell research initiative in California despite opposi· 
tlon from the conservative wmg of the Republican party). 
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policy challenges than those confronting the national party. And 
the mere existence of state governmental institutions gives dif-
ferent politicians a platform not controlled by the party leader-
ship. Unless British devolution goes much further than it has 
thus far, it is hard to see how British parties would generate a 
similar dynamic. 
Nonetheless, I cannot help but think that Professor Tom-
kins's instinct to build upon the separation of powers that Eng-
land has inherited from its history-rather than to strain to 
shoehorn England's arrangements into a Madisonian tripartite 
model-is the right one. In any event, Tomkins's discussion of 
the institutional separation between Crown and Parliament re-
turns us to the principal virtue of Public Law for American 
readers: It is immensely healthy and fruitful, I think, to recognize 
that other well-functioning democracies may set things up com-
pletely differently than we do. And as our own system diverges 
further and further from the Madisonian model- for instance, 
through the continuing development of the administrative 
state-the alternative possibilities for holding government to ac-
count in different separated-power systems may become increas-
ingly relevant to our own. 
CONCLUSION 
If the dollar-sterling exchange rate stays where it is, then the 
most practical way for Americans operating on an academic's 
salary to learn about British constitutionalism will be to read 
about it in books. For this purpose, one can hardly do better 
than Public Law as an entree into the English system. It is like-
wise hard to imagine a better time for Americans to take up the 
subject, as English public law deals with the dual constitutional 
conundrums of European integration and far-reaching internal 
constitutional reform through devolution, revision of the House 
of Lords, and the like. The fundamental task of English public 
law at the dawn of the 21st century is to adapt a venerable and 
largely successful constitutional order to the fundamental chal-
lenges of globalization and the modernization of domestic soci-
ety. Notwithstanding the strangeness of the English system, that 
challenge may not be altogether unfamiliar to American readers. 
